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Abstract 
 Since the Neolithic period and the rise of agriculture along 
Mesopotamia’s “Fertile Crescent,” greater societies have formed thus 
requiring laws and governance to ensure their continued preservation. 
The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi is one such example of how 
agricultural technologies directly created new social and 
institutional structures in codifying slavery into law, or how 
mercantile transactions are to be conducted. Similarly, GMOs are the 
result of modern agricultural technologies that are altering laws and 
society as a result of their implementation. This transformation 
informs the central inquiries of my research question: Why are GMOs 
necessary, and what influences do they have on the project of human 
rights? As our age is defined by the products of bioluminescent – or 
glow-in-the-dark – cats and goats that can excrete spider silk 
proteins from their mammary glands, these questions become essential. 
I conclude that the technology does not, at least conceptually, 
conflict with or undermine human rights. Instrumental reason has firm 
limitations in biological applications as well as conflict with its 
inherent anarchical nature. We are now compelled to question the 
utility of genetic engineering and if it merely places humanity into 
another precarious “arms race” with weeds and pests, in addition to 
the pressure of maintaining current dependencies of petrochemicals, 
fertilizers, and continued observations of ecological homeostasis. 
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Chapter One: The Controversy in Context - Synthetic Syntheses and Life 
 The tree which moves some to tears of joy is in the Eyes of 
others only a Green thing that stands in the way. Some see Nature all 
Ridicule and Deformity, and by these I shall not regulate my 
proportions; and some scarce see Nature at all. But to the Eyes of the 
Man of Imagination, Nature is Imagination itself. As a man is, So he 
Sees. As the eye is formed, such are its Powers. 
William Blake, In a Letter to Reverend Dr. Trusler, 1799 
 
In an early-2001 Microsoft PowerPoint presentation titled “Future 
Strategic Issues/Future Warfare [Circa 2025],” Dennis M. Bushnell, 
Chief Scientist of NASA’s Langley Research Center, examined a number 
of not-so-hypothetical threats that the United States then had to 
consider. Based “upon existing data/trends/analyses/technologies 
(e.g., NO PIXIE DUST),” Bushnell wrote emphatic and frighteningly 
marvelous “bullets” detailing scenarios of “Rampant Recombinant Bio” 
and, referencing “dust” in a more serious context, a “Smart Dust.” 
This “Smart Dust” Bushnell envisioned in 2001 had the potential of 
being used as “Micro Dust Weaponry,” a “Mechanical Analog to Bio, 
Micron sized mechanized ‘dust’ which is distributed as an aerosol and 
inhaled into the lungs. Dust mechanically bores into lung tissue and 
executes various ‘Pathological Missions,’ that was in his view, ‘A 
Wholly ‘New’ class of Weaponry which is legal’” (Bushnell 2001). 
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Observing that this was an extension of a “WORLD [in] the throes of 
triple/exponential (IT/Bio/Nano) Technological Revolutions),” 
Bushnell’s presentation should cause us now, eleven years away from 
the fruition of the predictions, to consider what we have thus far 
made of these three revolutions, and what we have done to life itself. 
And that is without the interest of organizations such as DARPA, the 
Department of Defense’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. 
 As fantastical as the orientation of Bushnell’s presentation was, 
he wrote that in 2001 “Humans Have ‘Taken Over’ and Vastly Shortened 
‘Evolution’” and in regard to “Products/Life Forms” that a “Cross 
Species Molecular Breeding” and “Directed Evolution” were possible, 
and companies such as Maxygen and Nexia Biotechnologies converted 
these possibilities into realities. Through the use of recombinant DNA 
(rDNA) or “chimeric” molecules of DNA from divergent, parallel, or 
entirely separate evolutionary backgrounds and synthesizing them 
together as “directed evolution,” the nascent industry of 
biotechnology could overcome long-perceived limitations of biology. 
Products such as “BioSteel” and “Arctic Apples” are two examples of 
this technology’s use, as they are, respectively, transgenic (formed 
from chimeric rDNA) spider silk proteins produced from the mammary of 
goats, and apples that do not tarnish or oxidize as traditional apples 
would when sliced. Both examples marvelously solve and remedy what 
have been industrial obstacles whether from the inefficiencies of 
producing spider silk, or the costs and efforts that catering 
companies would accept in preparing food that could remain visually 
appealing hours into an event. Further and even more important to 
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consider, the application of rDNA technology carries with it the 
potential of alleviating world hunger, the first of eight Millennium 
Development Goals established by the United Nations. At the present 
time of this writing, projects like NERICA or the “New Rice for 
Africa” (an isogenic cultivar and not a genetically modified organism) 
and “golden rice” (a genetically modified organism proper) are seeking 
this prospect. 
Poised to ameliorate world hunger, exponentially rising food 
prices (one factor among many that helped to trigger the Arab Spring 
in Egypt), and the problem of heavily depleted, overworked, and 
stressed farmlands from soil erosion and the effects of climate 
change, GMOs, or the technology to genetically modify organisms would 
appear to be humanity’s “way out.” However, as I will argue, this “GMO 
Revolution,” just as the revolutions which preceded it, has its own 
consequences: Human law, society, and our environment will also change 
in tandem with the revolution. Where the Neolithic Revolution required 
the organization of society through law as an extension of its 
success, Rachel Carson’s 1962 Silent Spring and the implementation of 
the Environmental Protection Agency and similar regulatory responses 
were necessary following the pesticide and herbicide propelled Green 
Revolution. In considering this inextricable caveat of progress, the 
question developed can be stated as such: 
Why are GMOs necessary, and what influences do they have on the 
project of human rights? 
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Methodological Approach: 
The methodological approach and subsequent analysis utilized here 
is properly forked between critical theory, insofar as the 
technology’s aspects of an “instrumental rationality,” and their 
current implementation. Oxford University Press’ dictionary defines 
critical theory as a “philosophical approach to culture” that “seeks 
to confront the social, historical, and ideological forces and 
structures that produce and constrain it” (oxforddictionaries.com). As 
such, critical theory is an indispensable asset for analyses that 
hinge upon technological issues as a function of its unique ability to 
underscore the social, political, and economic consequences of 
technology on humanity. Instrumental rationality, stated roughly, is a 
means, and means merely, of how humans achieve a set of desired ends 
using the world and entities contained within it as a tool. For 
example, a rock is not simply a rock; it can serve as a hammer, a 
heated surface, a “deadfall” trap, or an innumerable number of other 
things though its instrumentality exists above its status as a rock. 
Though humans are not alone in this instrumental execution 
(chimpanzees are well known users of tools such as stems to extract 
termites from termite mounds), humans exist as the only species with 
the capacity to terraform or transform vast landscapes in accordance 
with intent.  
As major professor and advisor to this thesis, Steven C. Roach 
aptly illuminates this aspect of critical theory and its prominence in 
his Critical Theory of International Politics, Complementarity, 
Justice, and Governance (2010) as a foundational ground to attempts of 
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exposing “hidden sources of social reification” (Roach 2010). 
Integrated within this project, I will shift the reader’s 
consciousness towards the oppressive arms of technology stemming from 
(in my view) scientific reductionism in genetic engineering, and how 
this strict instrumentality alters and “reifies” itself socially. 
Placed in a more direct purpose within the scope of this work, I am to 
mean when a crop is no longer a crop in a basic utilitarian scheme, 
but when its genetic code (both proprietary and altered through 
recombinant processes) becomes its own identity in law, as through 
patents, and in society. Substantiated by what Steven Roach identified 
as the first generation critical theorist Theodore Adorno’s “strain of 
radical Hegelian idealism,” social and historical progress never 
occurs through mediating “a middle element between extremes,” but 
“through the extremes, in the extremes themselves” as a result of the 
inherent subjectivity of experience (Adorno 1993). I elected to add 
inclusions of post-left anarchist thought to serve as such an 
“extreme” on the matter of scientific progress as a way to underline 
thought posed by the cynics of progress. Exemplified by another 
extreme, I selected the most far-reaching and conceptually radical 
ends of genetic and molecular research as underscored in the 
introduction. From these two extremes, and an examination of the raw 
effects of GMOs, I am able to answer why the science is both necessary 
and from that vantage point, to demonstrate how technology shapes 
human rights. 
I have elected an equally unorthodox methodology, interpretivism, 
as the tradition is well aligned to critical theorists, who were among 
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the early opponents of the Vienna Circle and late nineteenth-century 
positivist thought. Interpretivism owes its advantage as a research 
method to a raw connection of ideas and concepts to world developments 
and their historical significance. For instance, Oswald Spengler’s 
1918 work The Decline of the West and its production cannot be owed to 
an algorithmic decoding of stochastic phenomena; rather, it was 
Spengler’s assessment of the stages of civilization and technology as 
holistic and inseparable processes that built his conclusion. 
Conversely, positivists and statisticians promote a truth that exists 
within filtered, verified, and numerical representations of phenomena, 
and thereby contend for a single, universal, firm, fixed, and 
irrefragable reality that any observer who executes logic to a proper 
end can apprehend said truth. While interpretivists also submit that 
there is a wide profundity of hermeneutic and phenomenological 
conduits to such a unified reality as proposed by positivists, these 
conduits are grounded in social constructions, language, and even 
limitations in consciousness. Interpretivism then, I believe, is the 
best candidate to examine some underlying stand-in for a Kantian 
noumenon or a realized yet fully inaccessible universal truth. 
Methodologically framed, interpretivist analyses of history and 
society directly inform the larger structures present within organized 
humanity. 
With regard to spotlighting the issue of human rights 
internationally, my investigation is undertaken through asking whether 
the right to know, a right of privacy, and a right of choice (or 
choice from) is preserved and / or protected in the adoption of GMO 
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technology. It is my hope that this procedure of analysis does not 
present itself as merely presenting a strawman of GMO technology, or 
to simply deploy some level of a “naturalistic fallacy” or appeal to 
nature in assuming that what can be associated with nature (apart from 
human science and thought) should be privileged above the “unnatural.” 
I shall seek to show that GMO technology does not, at least 
conceptually, conflict with or undermine these above human rights. To 
address this aim, the paper will be broken up into two separate 
segments. The first segment is constructed of its own subtopics, being 
instrumental rationality, technological progress, and the twentieth-
century advancements in agriculture; the second segment has its own 
respective subtopics, being the matter of human rights and 
consequences of technology. 
 
Framework and Overlay of Analysis: 
 This section will seek to resolve and clarify the multiple 
threads of reasoning present in the following chapters. Until this 
point, I have briefly hinted toward how the structure of this paper is 
organized. I determined that a necessary component is an explicit 
overlay of the arguments. In reading this subheading alone, one will 
be better adapted in understanding a thorough perspective of why, and 
a preview of where, my arguments detour. 
 Chapter Two, titled “The Convergence of Agriculture, Society, and 
Technology,” problematizes the tripartite arrangement of – as might be 
readily guessed – agriculture, society, and technology. Together, 
these elements are found to be neither separate nor discrete as a 
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consequence of human history. As such, these elements together form a 
sharp point of a precarious “Sword of Damocles” scenario in which 
humanity either adopts the ideology of continued progress, or suffers 
collapse. As a focus of the chapter, agriculture’s reliance on 
development and technology is found to have ideological trappings that 
set it on this course as found in Hardeman and Jochemsen’s analysis of 
the Treaty of Rome and CIGAR, or the Consortium of International 
Agricultural Research Centers. While critical theorists were apt in 
identifying the creation of artificial needs through technology, they 
did not encompass an even more provocative idea that the origination 
of technology itself (before there was ever a project of Wilsonian 
liberalism) led to our enslavement and effective domestication. I use 
this chapter to underline ideological forces present in agricultural 
technology and their deployment with the added thoughts of post-left 
anarchists John Zerzan and Terrence McKenna. Wholly combined, the 
chapter summarizes the political and social factors which spurred on 
the Green Revolution across the developing world and, from that 
vantage, decouples and examines ideological commitments involved in 
agriculture and technology. Poised in an even more problematic sense, 
I address a refusal of technology in the wakening of neo-Luddism. 
Overall, the chapter identifies a functional (anarchism and critical 
theory) and epistemic (what historical factors led to implementation) 
account of ideology in agricultural processes. 
 Chapter Three carries the critiques offered by neo-Luddites of 
the second chapter into contemporary skepticism of GMOs. Titled “The 
Seeds of Control and Disenchantment,” I begin to establish how a 
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Heideggerian “instrumental reason” took the Green Revolution to 
further heights that largely fail as a consequence of hubris and from 
evolutionary principles. Summarily defined through an example provided 
by Heidegger himself, “instrumental reason” is a point at which a 
river adjoining a nuclear power plant ceases to be simply a river – it 
is now “coolant” for that power plant rather than a river merely. It 
is the redefinition of essence in bridging the “instrumental” 
capacities of the natural world into a strictly purpose-driven means. 
To illustrate the effect of instrumental reason’s application in the 
biological realm, I examine Biosphere 2 – an enclosed ecosystem 
inhabited by scientists – and the reasons for its failure. As a way of 
introducing costs and drawbacks to GM technology, Biosphere 2 serves 
to help disarm ideologically-charged reasons for genetic 
modification’s status as a panacea. Biosphere 2 embodies a crux of how 
evolution and biology inhabit an anarchical world that is unyielding 
to control and domestication, and does so in a way that is not too 
dissimilar to the post-left anarchists and their refusal of 
technology. 
 Chapter Four then amplifies an unease of imposing technology onto 
biological organisms further in asking how human rights are altered in 
the adoption of GMOs. In the fulfillment of answering my research 
question, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), helps in 
introducing English common law and the convention that biological 
organisms are able to be patented. Intellectual property, the right of 
disclosure or a right to know, the right of security or self-
preservation (in lieu of ecological concerns), and a right to question 
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ethics all serve as a sort of tritium to the sight of addressing human 
rights within the GMO question. Absurd scenarios are considered in 
this section. Particularly considered are the societal and 
institutional transformations under GMOs, including what clonal crops 
could tell us regarding widespread use of GMOs, and how nanomachines 
can emulate wayward genetic hybridization into indigenous plant and 
animal populations. In the end of this chapter, I reaffirm the earlier 
conclusions of Chapter Three, that biology is anarchical and, though 
GMO technology indeed restructures the planet’s ecosystem, it contains 
within it its own end as a contradiction. 
 As the last chapter, Chapter Five employs a parallax or optical 
fixture between the disparate Chapters Two and Three, and presents an 
ultimate conclusion. GMOs do not, at least conceptually, threaten the 
project of human rights, however ecological projects do need to 
consider the allure and resulting thrall of genetic engineering and 
that the costs, in the author’s view, are simply not worth enduring. 
In this chapter, I reintroduce Terence McKenna and his 
conceptualization of a “plant based model of social organization” as a 
way to proceed with the twenty-first century and include Slavoj 
Žižek’s fair yet well-reasoned point that true ecologists should 
reside in garbage before answering how humanity must directly engage 
with environmental and biological problems.  
 In sum, one is correct to identify hubris of “instrumental 
reason” and ideology in the science of GMOs, and the institutions that 
favor their adoption. Likewise, one should at this departure know with 
certainty that, engineered or otherwise, biological entities are an 
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“is” and not an “ought.” Life adapts to environmental and ecological 
constraints regardless of its particular engineering. To fully remedy 
this problem, an entire ecosystem would require genetic engineering; 
at this point, that nears the level of a fool’s errand, evidenced by 
the simple failings of Biosphere 2. Overall, I divided this work into 
two separate sections. The first section examines a historical and 
social raison d'etre for GMOs, while the second underscores costs and 
effects of GMOs at a conceptual level. In turn, it is agreeable that 
no particular entity – be it science, technology, humanity, or non-
human biological entities – has full reign to act independently of the 
others. Oddly enough, this constitutes a kind of rarely-mentioned 
freedom. 
 
Literature Review: 
Mirroring the project as a whole, the literature review conducted 
will also be separated into two segments with one crossover. The first 
part of this literature review will focus on what is entailed by 
instrumental reason as well as the basis of instrumental reason in 
addition to its critics and criticism of instrumental reason. The 
second segment, as one may predict, will focus on human rights and GMO 
technologies as the overlap is currently understood: the crossover 
mentioned will address GMO technology itself to bridge both segments 
together. Through this organization of literature, will be able to 
easily grasp and interface with the discrete components afoot in the 
admixture of the work so as that everyone has an albeit limited though 
still comprehensive understanding of GMO technology, the technological 
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process, technology itself, and finally, the current problems of human 
rights as through the lens of GMO technologies in their current 
instantiations. 
Of the various definitions for technology, this work simply 
refers to technology as the human capacity to use implements or 
knowledge toward a particular goal. As a foundation, in The Question 
Concerning Technology (1977), the German philosopher Martin Heidegger 
parallels the above definition of technology and what it is to address 
its effects in the following section:  
“We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it 
is. Everyone knows the two statements that answer our question. 
One says: Technology is a means to an end. The other says: 
Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of technology 
belong together. For to posit ends and procure and utilize the 
means to them is a human activity. The manufacture and 
utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured 
and used things themselves, and the needs and ends that they 
serve, all belong to what technology is. The whole complex of 
these contrivances is technology. Technology itself is a 
contrivance, or, in Latin, an instrumentum” (Heidegger 1977, pp. 
1-2). 
Essentially, and truly by essence here explicitly, technology is the 
human activity of determining ends and realizing the means necessary 
to reach those desired ends. The reason why Heidegger “questions” 
technology in this essay conveniently overlaps with the question 
concerning human rights in that Heidegger’s views and Bushnell’s 
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civil-military perspective would equally both admit, as Heidegger 
writes, “we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of 
technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the 
technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain 
unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or 
deny it” (Heidegger 1977). Contra to the conspiracy theorists who 
first discovered the PowerPoint presentation of Bushnell on NASA’s 
servers, the reason why the presentation was held and of importance to 
the Federal program was not to suggest a solution to the problem of 
overpopulation and devise novel ways to eliminate people, but rather 
as a necessary extension of the inescapable quality of the 
“technological” direction of warfare and the strategic pillars new 
technologies would structure. Drawing this into the focus of GMO and 
rDNA technologies, one ought to recognize that our intellectual and 
even pre-intellectual history has influenced the genetics of other 
species for our own purposes, in virtue to proving Heidegger’s 
assessment of our “chain” with the process, and that these 
technologies exist as a different form of the activity. 
 But “‘What is modern technology?’ It too is revealing. Only when 
we allow our attention to rest on this fundamental characteristic does 
that which is new in modern technology show itself to us” (Heidegger 
1977, p. 6).  What, then, is fundamentally new in rDNA and GMO 
technology? Let us consider the geneticists and methods of artificial 
selection on the evolutionary process to assess what truly is novel. 
Two examples are that of the domestication of maize by the 
Mesoamericans and the nineteenth-century friar Gregor Mendel’s 
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hybridization and inheritance experiments of peas as a baseline of 
what the origins of GMO technology resembled. In a thoroughly 
comprehensive book on the subject of maize by Duccio Bonavia, we are 
privy to an account of how early humans technologically altered nature 
towards their own desired agricultural end. Concerning this point, he 
states:  
“Galinate discussed the possibility that there have been several 
domestications that followed different paths. He believes that 
teosinte Chalco may have been domesticated by a combination of a 
reduction in the cupules [base of the husk] and an elongation of 
the kernels, which led to such varied modern derivates as the 
Palomero Toluqueño, the Confite Morocho, and the Gourd Seed Dent. 
The majority of the maizes may predominantly come from another 
independent domestication, which apparently entails the tunicate 
locus and the Guerrero teosinte. . . Human selection, undertaken 
to attain recessive alleles to obtain a thick cob in the string 
cob loci, increased the vascular supply required for the more 
productive development of the ear. The long rachillae, plus wider 
pith, enabled the attainment of the enormous cobs of contemporary 
maize” (Bonavia 2013, p. 62). 
Bonavia writes that a 1980s DNA study on isozymes and chloroplastic 
DNA showed that “teosinte is the species most closely related with 
maize, and which assumed a phylogenetic ascent of species with the 
biggest number of shared genes” (Bonavia 2013, p. 62). These models 
all account for maize, an entirely new plant corn, engineered and 
developed from native teosintes (formally the genius of Zea) through a 
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process of “human selection.” From the teosintes to maize-teosintes 
hybrids and to maize, one can see a greater specialization and 
emphasis on the size and length of the husk in addition to the 
presence and development of larger kernels. The vast geographical 
distribution of teosintes from Mexico to Peru and the relatively 
“quick” emergence of an identifiable husk to the structure of corn did 
not occur as an accident; the Mesoamericans of 5500 to 4500 BC 
cultivated the crop through selective breeding. This would indicate 
that humans have tailored the genetics of a natural world to their 
desired ends, though the matter of what is “new” in the modern 
technology is left unaddressed. 
 Aside from the Mesoamericans’ domestication of maize, and the 
earlier domestication of canines, equines, and other farm animals, the 
“technology” remained the process of selecting a set of traits over 
others. Plato and The Republic in this sense was not the first case of 
viewing inheritance (genes) as an instrumental mechanism, but instead, 
among one of the earlier recognitions of this effect. The concept of 
inheritance was there by proxy, though it had yet to be formalized; 
this discovery would form the studies of a Silesian friar, Gregor 
Mendel. Mendel selected among thirty-four varieties of peas and 
defined an experiment in hybridization whereby the plants would be 
constrained to have constant differentiating characteristics over 
generations, protection from foreign pollens, and a “generation time” 
that would be “short enough to make it possible to perform the 
experiment for generations” (Tateno 2013, p. 4). Conducting  the 
experiment at his monastery, the friar cultivated an impressive 
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catalog of 29,000 plants under the scientific species designation of 
Pisum sativum to “deduce by law” the characteristics which appear in 
successive generations through the criteria of fifteen characteristics 
and then further winnowed them down to seven once hybridization 
occurred – “form of the seed, color of the seed albumen, color of the 
seed coat, form of the ripe pods, color of unripe coat, positions of 
the flowers, and length of the stem” (Tateno, 2013: 5). Like the 
Mesoamericans before him, Mendel was not aware of genes or 
chromosomes, and, just as the Mesoamericans, only of plant 
characteristics (Tateno 2013, p. 5). From these seven plant 
characteristics Mendel would predict the patterns of inheritance 
allowing future geneticists a foundation on which to base their 
analysis; he was the preeminent scientist in that a theory was 
required prior to there being an established field with prior 
theories. Between a dominant trait (A) and a recessive trait (a), 
Mendel calculated that the hybridized offspring could be expressed as 
(A+a)(A+a) = A2+ 2Aa+a2 (Tateno 2013, p. 7). This much is clear: 
further research on what causes rDNA and GMO technology to be 
revolutionary, and in the ways that is revolutionary, must become a 
dedicated portion of research so as to understand the question as 
structured by Heidegger’s question on technology. 
 A litany of critics rallying against “instrumental reason,” or 
what Heidegger means by writing that “the essence of technology is by 
no means anything technological” (instead, as an ongoing process 
defined not by its products, but by an impulse) also have a place in 
this preliminary discussion on genetic modification and technology as 
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the crossover into the issue of human rights. Clearly stated, though 
Heidegger opposed technology for its absence of perspective, others 
oppose technological progress itself on foundational grounds. 
 John Zerzan, an American anarcho-primitivist philosopher 
associated with the 1996 Ted Kaczynski / “Unabomber” trial concludes 
in Elements of Refusal (1988) that, as far as how human agriculture 
relates to technology, the “land itself becomes an instrument of 
production and the planet’s species its objects” (Zerzan 1988, p. 73). 
Part to my earlier concern of avoiding an argument from nature or 
naturalistic fallacy however, Zerzan asserts that agriculture “is the 
birth of production, complete with its essential features” forming in 
his view, the ultimate “deformation of life and consciousness” (Zerzan 
1988, p. 73). As critique, Zerzan unifies the crop as a synthesis of 
our domestication of nature with the domestication of our freedom in 
lamenting that, “[w]ild or tame, weeds or crops speak of that duality 
that cripples the soul of our being” (Zerzan 1988, p. 73). As an 
outcome of this effect, he asserts that “despotism, war and 
impoverishment [present in] high civilization” are product to 
separation of an earlier oneness with nature. It should be apparent 
from these points why Zerzan spoke for the actions of Ted Kaczynski 
whose bombings targeted advanced artificial intelligence researchers. 
The forced march of civilization, which Adorno recognized in the 
‘assumption of an irrational catastrophe at the beginning of history,’ 
which Freud felt as ‘something imposed on a resisting majority,’ of 
which Stanley Diamond found only ‘conscripts, not volunteers,” were 
dictated, and products of by agriculture” (Zerzan 1988, p. 73). 
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 With agriculture being identified by Zerzan as the locus of all 
technology, and thereby further specialization, which propelled human 
civilization into “despotism” and did so with the help of Diamond’s 
“conscripts, not volunteers,” some examination of anarchist and 
critical thought is necessary. His inclusion within this analysis is 
essential as Zerzan is an advocate of a future that is primitive 
rather than technological. A common theme present throughout his works 
such as Twilight of the Machines (2008) and Running On Emptiness 
(2002) orbits a notion that technology, rather than unifying the world 
and allowing wider human flourishment, is the very force that 
alienates, stratifies, and removes us from our humanity. Understanding 
how human rights and its expansive array of issues and literature 
synergize and converge with GMO technology and the function of 
technology itself to “domesticate” on an agricultural basis seems the 
right investigation to undertake in the process of research on this 
issue.  Though let us stay on such an analysis of agriculture and 
technology for now and refocus on how technology itself and its 
“essence” can bring about “despotism.” 
 American popularizer of science and public intellectual, Bill Nye 
(also known as “Bill Nye the Science Guy”) has written on the matter 
of GMOs specifically. Nye writes in his 2014 publication Undeniable: 
Evolution and the Science of Creation that, while producing a 
“sufficient supply of food is an urgent need,” we cannot “know what 
will happen to other species in [a] modified organism’s ecosystem” 
(Nye 2014). To illuminate this principle, Nye uses the example of the 
Monarch butterfly and its seasonal migration of North America. As corn 
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fields resistant to Roundup (a product of Monsanto) become more 
common, and as the pesticide is more widely used, fields dotted with 
milkweed, a staple of the Monarch, will become less common. The 
result, of course, would result in the reduction of available food for 
Monarch caterpillars, thereby affecting their numbers. Theorizing 
further, and in parallel with the governing primary principle of this 
paper, Nye postulates the possibility that Bt corn (a GMO variant of 
corn that carries a resilience against pests) could have its Bt, a 
protein harmful to insects and produced by a microorganism, spread via 
pollen dispersal onto fields of milkweed, thereby reducing Monarch 
communities through pollen pollution. If both are true, laments Nye, 
“then the genetically modified plants are coming after the Monarchs in 
two ways at once” (Nye 2014). Though Nye, in an “AMA” or “Ask Me 
Anything” thread on the news and discussion aggregator Reddit later 
recanted these concerns (for reasons that have yet to be explained by 
Nye) after “visiting the scientists of Monsanto,” I will later explore 
what Nye may have possibly overlooked with regard to ecosystems and 
their full totalities (Kloor 2015). 
In referencing Theodore Adorno’s “assumption of an irrational 
catastrophe at the beginning of history,” Zerzan’s owes some of his 
anarcho-primitivist views to the German Frankfurt School of the 
twentieth century. Among the early Frankfurt School theorists who 
would eventually represent “critical theory” were Max Horkheimer, 
Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm. Marcuse considered 
how society is altered by technology’s separate nature from the 
technological. Marcuse serves this project well through encapsulating 
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how a technology carries political and sociological change, and not 
necessarily positive change, with its adoption. 
In One-Dimensional Man (1964) Marcuse, in a part titled the “One-
Dimensional Society” developed the problem into a brash declaration on 
the state of affairs: “If the worker and his boss enjoy the same 
television program and visit the same resort places. If the typist is 
an attractively made up as the daughter of her employer, if the Negro 
owns a Cadillac, if they all read the same newspaper, then this 
assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes…” (Marcuse 
1964, p. 17). By “disappearance of classes,” Marcuse means that 
technology and the continued creation of needs eventually removes the 
idea of class from society, as he asked: “Can one really distinguish 
between the mass media as instruments of information and 
entertainment, and as agents of manipulations and indoctrination? 
Between the automobile as nuisance and as convenience? Between the 
horrors and the comforts of functional architecture? Between the work 
for national defense and the work for corporate gain? Between the 
private pleasure and the commercial and political utility involved in 
increasing the birth rate?” (Marcuse 1964, p. 17). 
The picture that is rendered by Marcuse is one in which “resisting 
majority” of Freud and “conscripts” of Diamond have been, to borrow 
Zerzan’s use of the word, “domesticated” by technology to the point of 
dissolution of identity – a transformation towards “one 
dimensionality.” Could this domestication or one dimensionality extend 
to the species and crops that have undergone rDNA modification? To 
answer this, I must now address the preliminaries of how rDNA and 
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contemporary methods in artificial selection differentiate from the 
Mesoamericans’ cultivation of maize and Mendel’s systemized 
inheritance. 
 Second to the analysis of how rDNA and genetically modifying 
plants in the modern context differs from domestication and artificial 
selection, I must also examine how this technology and the application 
of instrumental reason have altered the scope of human rights and the 
greater environment. Though biosecurity and biosafety often merge the 
environment with human rights, here my approach is in partitioning the 
issue such that when clearly defined as one issue or another, the 
effects are known. At this point I will admit that this distinction is 
purely arbitrary. One’s environment directly influences the 
possibilities and overall quality of life. Such an idea was the 
established basis for United Nations Resolution 64/292 that 
“explicitly recognized the human right to water and sanitation” and 
“acknowledged that clean drinking water and sanitation are essential 
to the realization of all human rights” and many similar laws and 
resolutions throughout the mid-twentieth century into today (UN.org). 
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Chapter Two: The Convergence of Agriculture, Society, and Technology 
Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a 
representation. 
Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 1967 
  
 The aim of this chapter is to outline as well as problematize an 
interwoven and complex system of dependencies. This system is 
structured at a “convergence” of agriculture, technology, and society 
in so far as they can be separately delineated. Agriculture is itself 
a technological feat and is vastly improved as a consequence of 
technological progress. Similarly, human civilization depends on the 
sustained growth and management of agriculture and technology to 
flourish. Does any “break” or disunity in this tripartite arrangement 
result in inevitable collapse? Is humanity inextricably bound, even 
beyond its own will or through the promise of technology, to fate? 
 On the outset of this project it is of critical and fundamental 
importance to understand that technology, agriculture, and human 
society are vitally intertwined. All three within this “trinity” of 
sorts function as an ecosystem in their own right: neither component 
exists as a wholly discrete entity. The character and form of human 
society is fundamentally shaped and determined by its environment. 
Conversely, human culture, language, and knowledge all limit and 
produce what is technologically realizable, as well as how nature 
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itself is conceived. Lastly, agriculture, or a domesticated nature, is 
limited and defined by ecological and environmental constraints – 
weather patterns, properties of the soil, et cetera.  A classical 
rendition of these relations would likely depict humans gradually 
developing more efficient technologies to subdue the chaos of an 
unpredictable environment thereby allowing a larger and more 
prosperous human society to further develop. The cycle then begins 
anew, and it continues ad infinitum with the addition that humans 
introduce more order in counter-acting disorder. Would it be a fair 
characterization to suggest that this rudimentary sketch remains true 
and relevant in the context of today, some twelve thousand years after 
the advent of agriculture?  
 A preliminary answer to this question stemming from reflection 
alone would be a definite “no.” While technology has delivered on the 
promise of domesticating and pacifying the earth to sufficiently fit 
our needs, the impulse and want for these very needs has set us 
precariously underneath a “Sword of Damocles.” Whereas in the 
classical depiction of the relationship among human society, 
agriculture, and technology, all function within a clearly defined 
instrumental synergy, and the three are now bound by an anergy. 
Climate change, population growth, and unsustainable resource 
management practices have all made brittle what links the components 
of the trinity. The interdependence among the three should not be 
mistaken as a strength and instead viewed as a weakness. Any break or 
catastrophe affecting one or all of the components would spell equal 
disaster for the others in a cascade effect. Failure to develop 
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technology to counter-act climate change, overuse of resources or 
pesticides, overproduction and under-consumption, and poorly-adapting 
crops to their environment would all, for different reasons, come with 
the same consequence, overpopulation notwithstanding.  
 Such a predicament was the raison d’être for the international 
organization CGIAR. CGIAR or the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research, owes its origin to the period of decolonization 
following World War II when “serious food shortages occurred in South 
Asia” during a time when many were “predicting a worldwide impending 
famine” (D.J. Greenland 1997, p. 460). CGIAR’s role was then to 
ameliorate this tenuous interdependence of technology, human society 
and agriculture through choosing to focus on technology as the 
fulcrum. Its stated mission, summarized by its chairman, is to use a 
strategic, science-based focus on increasing “the pile of rice on the 
plates of food-short consumers” (Consultative Group on International 
Agriculture 2004, p. 1). In sum, CGIAR is the international version of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s vision of a “chicken in every pot.” Funded 
by the World Bank and its sixty-two member states, CGIAR wrote of this 
contemporary problem in agricultural production: “According to the 
CGIAR’s own analysis, the decline in the number of food-insecure 
people in the developing world slowed considerably in the 1980s and 
1990s relative to the 1970s, the period of the Green Revolution. 
Indeed, if China is excluded, the number of food insecurity increased 
in the rest of the developing world in the 1990s, while the annual 
rate of growth in cereal yields decelerated from 2.9 percent during 
1967-82 to 1.9 percent during 1982-97. The rate of growth in cereal 
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yields is projected to decline further” (Consultative Group on 
International Agriculture 2004, p. 4). 
CGIAR claims itself as a “non-political” institution in the 
context of researching the means to further increase crop yields. 
Though could this be true in accordance with the reason for CGIAR’s 
existence? In a 2012 article “Are There Ideological Aspects to the 
Modernization of Agriculture” appearing in the Journal of Agricultural 
& Environmental Ethics, Danish authors Egbert Hardeman and Henk 
Jochemsen contrasted the vision of CGIAR in that they observed “a 
blinkered quest for efficiency in the industrialization of agriculture 
since the Second World War” (Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, p. 657). 
They noted that the “key factor is the cultural mindset at the 
foundation of our modern society, originating from the ideas of the 
enlightenment” and concluded that it was what made “people vulnerable 
to ideologies, causing them to focus on a certain goal without 
considering the consequences” (Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, p. 657). 
In returning to this subsection’s theme, Hardeman and Jochemsen 
do not agree with the fixed and static rendition of humans, 
technology, and agriculture working in harmony. Instead the results of 
their study concluded that “due to the overemphasis on efficiency, 
modern industrial agriculture has never been comfortably embedded in 
its ecological and social context, and as a result displays the 
characteristics of an ideology” (Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, p. 658). 
Their analysis was threefold in that they first analyzed the 
historical conditions and reasons for why ideology has become enmeshed 
within agricultural production and modernization, then move towards 
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the cultural and ethical motives of industrialization, and lastly, 
they identify the “roots of the tensions and resistance to solutions” 
(ibid). All three maneuvers are critical in the project of unveiling 
not only why GMOs are necessary, but also how a wider 
industrialization of agriculture can manifest in the form of ideology 
unfettered with the cause of human rights. 
Of the factors outlined in their typification of the history of 
agriculture, Hardeman and Jochemsen noted decreasing marginal returns, 
rationalization (which will become important in the subsequent 
subtopic), structural problems, and a “gap between agriculture and 
society” (Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, pp. 659-661). The first reason 
of decreasing marginal returns echoes Karl Marx’s account of 
overproduction and under-consumption in Das Kapital (1867) in that 
technological improvements increase overall productivity while also 
diminishing the economic value of wealth and rate of returns on 
profit. Hardeman and Jochemsen found the opposite, and that many 
“changes in modern agriculture take place in the context of decreasing 
revenues and increasing costs. Although market prices always fluctuate 
in each sector of the economy, agriculture is characterized by long 
periods of low prices and short periods of high prices. At same time, 
the costs of necessary inputs in agriculture keep pace with general 
inflation: feed, labor, land, and machine prices have increased 
constantly” Jochemsen 2012, pp. 659-660). Farmers facing this economic 
problem in their view appeared “to have no alternative but to 
participate in the developments of mechanization, intensification, and 
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specialization in order to maintain a reasonable income” (Hardeman and 
Jochemsen 2012, pp. 659-660). 
 As a reverberation of the earlier literature review concerning 
technology and the “technological” being distinct for Heidegger, 
Adorno, and Zerzan, the typified cause of “rationalization” proved to 
be a captivating thought in the piece. On this, Hardeman and Jochemsen 
determined that it was “in this context” that “rationalization may be 
defined as the introduction of goal-rational methods in a process 
previously based on accumulated experience, ultimately to achieve 
greater efficiency in agriculture” (Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, p. 
660). It was therefore in Hardeman and Jochemsen’s view, an “essential 
characteristic of industrialization, evidencing the particular 
influence of science and technology. Fueling the engine of this 
industrialization, they assert that all measures taken by government 
in the interest “to change the structure of agriculture” are “informed 
with the desire for rationalization” (Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, p. 
660). Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome (1957), a precursor to the 
European Union, underscored Hardeman and Jochemsen’s analysis of 
agriculture and its rationalization as an appendage of government in 
that it was a specific activity to regulate. Specifically, Article 39 
enumerates policy objectives that “increase agricultural productivity 
by promoting technological progress and by ensuring the rational 
development of agricultural production” (European Economic Community, 
1957). 
 This however presents a problem. When rationality becomes 
entirely instrumental in the practice of agriculture, it transforms 
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into an “economic pincer,” causing “agricultural activities became 
more and more uniform” (Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, pp. 660-661). As 
the economic pincers of instrumentality closed in on the farmers, they 
ironically would seek the very same scientific data and technology in 
their search for a solution, thus centralizing agriculture further and 
subsequently adding greater economic pressure. This, Hardeman and 
Jochemsen state, “made agricultural science a globalizing factor” 
(Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, pp. 660-661). Now a globalizing factor, 
agricultural technologies, such as herbicides and pesticides as 
employed during the Green Revolution (1940-1970) altered the economics 
of farmers and development of entire continents without the option for 
alternatives. Latin and Central America felt the greatest effect of 
the Green Revolution as it was the very fulcrum to further specialize 
its traditionally agrarian economies. In the view of Hardeman and 
Jochemsen, this “resulted in highly impoverished diversity in present 
day agriculture” when compared to earlier centuries (Hardeman and 
Jochemsen 2012, pp. 660-661). 
 This problem, as posed by Hardeman and Jochemsen, is at the 
cross-section of CGIAR’s policy recommendations and investments in 
agricultural research. Resulting in the disunity and anergy between 
technologies, human society, and agriculture, they lament that 
“contemporary agriculture is a can of worms. Experts, both policy-
makers and researchers have tried and are still trying to find 
solutions. And despite all efforts on a global scale, they have not 
managed to find effective and workable solutions. Generally speaking, 
the solutions used usher in a paradox: often they reinforce or 
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aggravate the problems they should solve, or create new and sometimes 
worse problems” (Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, p. 662). When situated 
on the issue of GM technology and the unresolvable paradox, Hardeman 
and Jochemsen found that GMOs came about from the problems of the 
Green Revolution. “When these pesticides turned out to cause serious 
environmental problems themselves, a new technology was introduced: 
genetic engineering of plants to make them resistant, either to 
certain, presumably less toxic, pesticides or to the pest. But the use 
of genetic modification forces genetic erosion yet further. This 
spiral of problems and “solutions” shows that the use of modern 
techniques to deal with their deleterious side effects has caused new 
problems to accumulate” (Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, p. 668). In sum, 
Hardeman and Jochemsen explain quite well the reason why GMOs are 
necessary: they fulfill a rationalization of industry and thereby 
shape and alter the economic landscape. Today, that economic landscape 
is marked by the forces of globalization; either one agrees with an 
international practice, in this case, technology, or they are rendered 
a non-participant. 
 
Post-Left Anarchism and Critical Theory on the Question of Technology: 
Hardeman and Jochemsen were both keen to identify the paradox in 
finding a true panacea for the problems of contemporary agriculture 
under a technological-rational framework, however, the dilemma reaches 
to more benthic depths. The problem, some hold, lies within the very 
notion of technology itself. On the anarchist end of the spectrum, 
thinkers like John Zerzan and Terence McKenna agree with this view of 
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technology, and some, like McKenna, offer suggestions as to how the 
technological impulse can be retranslated into a harmonious 
relationship between humans and their environment. Alternatively, and 
amongst the Frankfurt School, which owes its influences to Marx and 
Freud, is the tendency to view technology or instrumental reason as a 
blunt dialectical force of bourgeois value. Like the anarchists, 
members of the Frankfurt School provide their own rough solutions 
amidst the criticisms. Herbert Marcuse, for example, advocates a 
recapturing of technology from its oppressive reigns.  
Let us begin in earnest with the most radical treatment of 
technology – the belief that technology was in itself the most 
definite and unresolvable problem that alienated humans from an 
organic life. Prior to the inception of agriculture, John Zerzan 
posits that it was the symbolization of nature which led to the 
inevitable separation of humans from their environment. Zerzan’s essay 
“Agriculture” in Elements of Refusal (1988) features such an account 
of how symbols brought about agriculture and technology to both break 
from and transform our environments. In it, he wrote on the origin of 
and domination by numbers: “‘In the non-commodified, egalitarian 
hunter-gatherer ethos, the basis of which (as has so often been 
remarked) was sharing, number was not wanted.’ There was no ground for 
the urge to quantify, no reason to divide what was whole” (Zerzan 
1988, p. 74). For Zerzan, it was not “until the domestication of 
animals and plants did this cultural concept fully emerge” (Zerzan 
1988, p. 74). From the work of Pythagoras, Euclid, and others like 
them in societies outside of the Hellenistic sphere came “a linear 
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rank order in which each member is assigned an exact numerical place” 
(Zerzan 1988, p. 74). In turn, Zerzan asserts that this placement of 
number within society followed “the anti-natural linearity of plow 
culture [and] the inflexible 90-degree gridiron plan of early cities” 
(Zerzan 1988, p. 74). It was the point at which culture, “numberized,” 
became “firmly bounded and lifeless” for Zerzan (Zerzan 1988, p. 74). 
Art as well had a function in this process of transformation: 
“Art, too, in its relationship to agriculture, highlights both 
institutions. It begins as a means to interpret and subdue 
reality, to rationalize nature, and conforms to the great turning 
point which is agriculture in its basic features. The pre-
Neolithic cave paintings, for example, are vivid and bold, a 
dynamic exaltation of animal grace and freedom. The Neolithic art 
of farmers and pastoralists, however, stiffens into stylized 
forms… With agriculture, art lost its variety and became 
standardized into geometric designs that tended to degenerate 
into dull, repetitive patterns, a perfect reflection of 
standardized, confined, rule-patterned life” (Zerzan 1988). 
 Zerzan’s idea should be lucidly clear at this point: agriculture 
is the byproduct of segmenting and representing the natural through 
synthetic means. When humanity began to symbolize through art and 
numbers, the world became easier to “divide from what was whole” to 
more easily render property, taxes, and of course land into 
commodities. As a consequence of this, humans not only removed 
themselves from the system in which they once belonged, but they also 
provided the means of dominating both themselves and nature. What a 
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possible solution to this view of technology may look like will be 
covered in the subsequent subtopic “On How to Potentially Salvage 
Technology.” 
 Herbert Marcuse begins One-Dimensional Man (1964) from the 
Marxist foundation in observing that a “comfortable, smooth, 
reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial 
civilization, a token of technological progress” (Marcuse 1964, p. 
13). Marcuse uses the text towards addressing positivism and its 
associated instrumental rationality that Hardeman and Jochemsen 
identified in the paradox of technological solutions. In the work, 
Marcuse argues that technology is not concerned entirely with either 
efficiency or being a solution, and is instead an extension of 
domination. “Today political power asserts itself through its power 
over the machine process and over the technical organization of the 
apparatus” (Marcuse 1964, p. 14). Describing the power wielded by 
technocrats of the period such as then Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara, Marcuse noted that the “government of advanced and advancing 
industrial societies can maintain and secure itself only when it 
succeeds in mobilizing, organizing, and exploiting the technical, 
scientific and mechanical productivity available to industrial 
civilization” (Marcuse 1964, p. 14). 
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Chapter Three: The Seeds of Control and Disenchantment 
 Genetic control. Information control. Emotion control. [...] 
 Everything is monitored, and kept under control. [...] The age of 
 deterrence has become the age of control. 
Hideo Kojima, Metal Gear Solid 4: Guns of the Patriots, 2008 
 
 Marcuse (1964) and Zerzan (1988) believe that our capacity to 
remain in control of technology and its ends is an illusion, and 
instead that it controls our lives. Considering contemporary events, 
who could fault them for their “Luddism?” Recent times offer exemplary 
ways in which Marcuse, writing in ’64, and Zerzan, in the late 
eighties to nineties, were in essence right. While both were surely 
familiar with novel incidents like the U.S. Department of Energy and 
Department of Defense’s Nevada Test Site and the “Baneberry shot” of 
1970 that resulted in the release of large amounts of radioactive 
fallout across the Midwestern states, they were also familiar with the 
patterns of technology (Lomov, Antoun, Wagoner, and Rambo 2004). 
Patterns that would foretell people such as Edward Snowden, a 
contractor for Booz Allen Hamilton whose 2013 “leak” of the NSA 
practicing wide and constitutionally questionable surveillance through 
an advanced datacenter in Utah and computer system “PRISM,” as nothing 
wholly new. 
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   From the anarcho-primitivist perspective, it is abundantly 
clear that technology is the prime cause of alienation and oppression. 
Reaching a conclusion on an order of Vladimir Lenin’s What is to be 
Done? here would simply mean to eschew many unnecessary comforts, or 
possibly build what is known as a “microhouse” (or small structure) in 
the middle of nowhere and to conduct a serious attempt at a Walden 
Pond (Henry David Thoreau) experience (Kaysing 1995). While perfectly 
legitimate and acceptable for many of India’s sadhus or holy men who 
engage in relatively extreme acts of austerity in religious asceticism 
living in caves and forests, such an act simply cannot work as a 
societal model. Instead, other possibilities must be considered. 
 The second anarchist mentioned in the previous subtopic, Terence 
McKenna, shares a fair amount of the skepticism towards technology and 
society with Zerzan. In a lecture titled “Into the Valley of Novelty” 
concerning the general state of affairs, he remarked that “[c]ulture 
is not your friend. Culture is for other people's convenience and the 
convenience of various institutions, churches, companies, tax 
collection schemes, what have you. It is not your friend. It insults 
you, it disempowers you. It uses and abuses you. None of us are well 
treated by culture, and yet we glorify the creative potential of the 
individual, the rights of the individual, we understand the felt 
presence of experience is most important, but the culture is a 
perversion” (McKenna 1998). 
 The Archaic Revival (1991) represents what a possible solution of 
McKenna would resemble. In the essay titled “Plan/Plant/Planet” 
(appropriately in specific relation to the continuing motif of 
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agriculture), McKenna proposed that “we should adopt the plant as the 
organizational model for life in the twenty-first century, just as the 
computer seems to be the dominant mental/social model of the late-
twentieth century” (McKenna 1991, p. 218). As a negation of positivism 
and instrumental reason’s grasp on the twentieth century, the idea was 
to reintegrate human society with nature itself through a wider 
symbiosis and recognition, much like the views found in ecofeminism 
and deep ecology, that we are a part and extension of the earth. 
 If one were to take seriously the “New Age” and possibly far 
flung idea of using the plant as the organizational model for society 
as McKenna suggests, the limits of instrumental reason would be made 
known and from there reconciled. In the case of the Biosphere 2 
experiment, for example, a “conceptual shift from a phenomenological 
understanding of the envelope of life to a physical, bio-, and 
geochemical approach to living matter and to the environment as a 
self-regulating and evolving system designed [as if it were] a 
planetary machine” (Höhler 2010, p. 42). While Biosphere 2 pursued the 
right course for a more holistic and integrative systems approach to 
life sciences, it still had its shortcoming. The project was flawed by 
an oversight that the limestone in concrete used to construct the 
arkological facility would leech carbon dioxide from the air and prove 
to undo the presumably homeostatic atmosphere. 
 Still, the best contender for answering the critiques of the 
Frankfurt School and anarcho-primitivists is in the shattering 
revision that the biological and natural is one holistic system onto 
itself where the traditional inputs and outputs of classical physics 
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and the Cartesian foundations of instrumental rationality are not so 
easily identified. Salvaging technology must be achieved through re-
envisioning the venture of science and practical reason through 
Heidegger.  
Captured German rocket scientist of Peenemünde, Wernher von 
Braun, often serves as an example of one who had a revisionary 
approach to science in that it should not be used as a weapon though 
as an instrument of peace, and he is often used as the example of how 
science must be reformed. Though von Braun is a curious example, much 
of his work was used in developing Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles, though he detested the weaponization of space. The captive 
of the Office of Strategic Services’ “Operation PAPERCLIP” and his 
views on the applications of science and how it was to achieve its 
goals were simply not revolutionary enough, and McKenna’s “plant-
based” paradigm seems necessary. In my view, problems arising from 
scientific advancement or ecological strains remedy themselves either 
through the work of visionaries or through historical necessity. 
Ecological homeostasis following a collapse however, as one may 
endeavor to imagine, will not always favor humanity. For example, John 
B. Calhoun’s behavioral research on mice given utopic conditions 
indicated findings of an ethologic or behaviorally imposed population 
capacity. After discord and fighting for territory subsided in the 
elaborate and fully stocked mouse enclosure, the mice abandoned social 
relations and breeding altogether. That is to say that if humanity 
were provided with an unending supply of food and water with the only 
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limitation being space, behavioral adaptations (behaviors 
nonconductive to reproduction) would emerge. 
 
GMO Technology and its Faulty Assumptions of the Evolutionary Process: 
Darwin had the concept of natural selection partially wrong upon 
the publication of the Origin of Species (1859). A lesser known 
critique offered at the time of its release was that, then, just as 
now, evolution is not a teleological process; it is not goal directed. 
Hearts and other essential vital organs are “perfect” only in so much 
that they serve their designated function appropriately. Traditional 
and more Cartesian views in science do not mesh well with biological 
organisms and ecosystems, as they are not only infinitely complex but 
that there is no one desired end. GMO engineering firms like the often 
scrutinized Monsanto (and rightly so in this author’s view) fail to 
see this problem in ways that will be demonstrated. 
Speaking on the mischaracterization and subject of evolution with 
the aid of observations from C.H. Waddington and Erich Jantsch, 
McKenna noted that they “found not the War in Nature that Darwinists 
reported by rather a situation in which it was not competitive ability 
but the ability to maximize cooperation with other species that most 
directly contributed to an organism’s being able to function and 
endure as a member of a biome” (McKenna 1991, p. 221). Eugenicists and 
GMO engineers are not on an equal plane in this matter, however they 
equally believe that it is possible to orchestrate the genetics of 
species towards desired ends. Nothing could be far more removed from 
what actually occurs in this process. 
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Appearing in a June 2013 edition of Nature Biotechnology, Bruce 
Tabashnik, Thierry Brévault, and Carrière Yves analyzed the insect 
resistance of biotech crops. Titled “Insect resistance to Bt crops: 
lessons from the first billion acres,” the authors of the study found 
that the “evolution of resistance in pests can reduce the 
effectiveness of insecticidal proteins from Bacillus thuringiensis 
produced by transgenic crops” (Tabashnik, Brévault, Yves 2013, p. 
510). What the authors of the study mean by “insecticidal proteins” is 
that the GMO crops have been engineered with the genetic information 
from a bacterium that naturally produces an insecticide, Bacillus 
thuringiensis. 
Effectively, any pests, or humans who consume the GM crop also 
consume the byproduct of the plants producing a toxin intended to 
increase crop yields from staving off pest infestations. Despite B. 
thuringiensis’ relative harmlessness in contrast to Clostridum 
botulinum’s paralytic condition of botulism, toxins are ingested by 
humans. Further, the authors of the study noted that the “reduced 
efficacy of B. thuringiensis crops caused by field-evolved resistance 
has been reported now for some populations of 5 of 13 major pest 
species examined, compared with the resistant populations of only one 
pest species in 2005 (Tabashnik, Brévault, and Yves 2013, p. 510). 
Applying instrumental reason and biotechnology into ecosystems has 
shown to be wholly ineffective as a long term solution if, in the 
course of eight years, four pests have evolved a resistance.   
Evolution being the open system with opaque and uncertain effects and 
influences has provided science with the insurmountable challenge of 
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devising adaptations for organisms that would present a hardened 
resilience. Hardeman and Jochemsen’s paradox again reemerges in that 
genetically modified crops have come to “reinforce or aggravate the 
problems they should solve” in addition creating “new and sometimes 
worse problems” (Hardeman and Jochemsen 2012, p. 662). And what is 
most troubling is that, as more insects develop this resistance, 
humanity pays a higher cost of consuming toxins that would otherwise 
not be present in their food. It is the classic example of a “lose-
lose” scenario, making “worse problems.” Thoroughly unsurprising, this 
finding underlies the concept of introducing exotic species into 
ecosystems with the intent to deal with a pest: the exotic species 
itself often becomes the new pest. Insects that must feed on GMO crops 
will evolve different and better mechanisms of overcoming the GMO 
safeguards, thereby creating a parallel similar to that of the battle 
between antibiotics and infectious bacteria. And, with respect to that 
arms race, industrial agriculture widely uses antibiotics as a means 
to increase yield in livestock. This practice, evolutionarily 
understood, implies that any zoonotic (cross-species) bacterial 
infection would enter human populations pre-resistant to anti-biotic 
drug classes. 
 
Learning from the Project and Failure of Biosphere 2:  
 Let us return to the earlier mentioned case of Biosphere 2 for 
the interest of bifurcating the experiment into two helpful inquiries 
to aid the present discussion of reengineering life. One, what was the 
intent in the construction and conceptualization of the project? And, 
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two, what could be understood in the project’s ultimate conclusion?  
In considering these questions, it should be readily apparent not only 
what occurs when a biological lifeform or even ecology is emulated, 
but also how the act of emulation presents shortfalls, insights, 
disasters, and potentially unavoidable adversities. 
 Biosphere 2 was designated as a “2nd” biosphere with the first 
being planet Earth. Designed in the 1980s, Biosphere 2 was a geodesic 
structure designed from the architectural tradition of its proponent 
and creator Buckminster Fuller. Geodesic structures and Fuller’s 
design prototypes gained a prominence in the late 1970s and ‘80s when 
the economic concern of utilizing the fewest amount of resources to 
produce the greatest amount of habitable space had also transformed 
into an ecological solution. Following publications such as Frank 
Herbert’s science fiction work Dune in 1965 and the NASA missions to 
the lunar surface in the late 1960s, an idea began to emerge about the 
Earth as a blue marble – a “spaceship Earth.” As a testament to this 
synthesis or idea of a spaceship Earth and the utility of Fuller’s 
designs, the Disney park of Epcot in Florida takes in both its name 
and iconic design this very concept as an attraction. A project of the 
‘80s and the now retro-futurism of its scientific and technological 
aims (e.g. a reusable space shuttle, the Strategic Defense Initiative, 
and electronic bulletin board communication networks), Biosphere 2 
captured the spirit of planetary ecology as a concept and, with it, 
asked if it were possible to build a “self-contained” planetary 
ecosystem. 
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 Systems ecologist John P. Allen and his firm Space Biosphere 
Ventures set ground on the project in 1987 in the arid plains of 
Oracle, Arizona. The structure, on its completion in 1991, featured a 
1,900 square meter rainforest, 850 square meter ocean and coral reef, 
450 square meter mangrove estuary, 1,300 square meter savannah, 1,400 
square meter fog desert, and 2,500 square meter agricultural system 
with an underground human habitat (b2science.org 2015). In sum, it 
comprised an area of three acres with 7,200,000 cubic feet of sealed 
glass constituted by 6,500 windows (b2science.org 2015). Space 
Biosphere Ventures performed two separate experiments (one from 
September 26, 1991 to September 26, 1993, and another from March to 
September 1994) during their ownership of the facility in which they 
would seal the research occupants into the “ark” to observe whether 
ecological interactions could continue within a given system having no 
inputs aside from sunlight (b2science.org 2015). This was the chief 
intent and purpose of the experiment. In a parallel to GM technology 
firms, the belief of Space Biosphere Ventures was that life processes 
and their respective ecosystems are not only identifiable, but that 
they can be manipulated towards desired ends. 
 The experiment ended in failure on both occasions. Though you 
know of a primary “why,” as one was briefly mentioned with regard to 
the CO
2
 and concrete leeching, the combined array of “whys” present a 
better picture. It is my own belief that, even in the early phase of 
conceptualizing Biosphere 2, it was a flawed experiment. Though its 
atmosphere’s homeostasis was disrupted by its very own construction 
through concrete, other problems also speak to the matter of how 
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Biosphere 2 was conceptually framed. For example, the first mission’s 
waters were overstocked of fish, which resulted in a cascade of 
failures from the resultant clogging of the filtration systems thereby 
causing the desert to become too wet (b2science.org 2015). Without 
tides or an environmental stimulus, bodies of water within the 
structure became stagnant. In this manner, Biosphere 2 is successfully 
illustrative in demonstrating two things: highlighting the hubris of 
humanity through its attempts of bio-engineering, and showing the 
unfathomable complexities of ecosystems. 
 One participant in Biosphere 2’s research as an inhabitant of the 
facility came to this realization after the near billion-dollar 
installation was abandoned.  In her TED Talk, Jane Poynter reminds us 
it is that the “small stuff counts” (TED). As the central theme of the 
lecture, Poynter provides many examples of where a micro-ecology 
affects the larger macro-ecology. Through this shifting of focus, 
Biosphere 2 did not fail simply because its waters were overstocked 
with fish, or that wildly growing morning glories (Ipomoea) ensnared 
the trees of the rainforest. Biosphere 2 failed in overlooking micro 
causes. Poynter came to this revelation from observing her Arizona 
backyard, barren with tumbled river quartz and covered with the fallen 
leaves of a neighbor’s tree. Though there was adequate shade from the 
tree to protect plants from exposure to the sun, nothing, no matter 
the effort or care, could grow in Poynter’s backyard. As if through a 
recollection of Biosphere 2, Poynter questioned what would happen if 
the leaves were left where they fell. After a short time of allowing 
the debris to accumulate, Poynter noticed that the leaves formed an 
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impromptu compost pile, providing enough nutrients and substrate in 
which wild grass can grow. Following the proliferation of the grass, 
Poynter would also observe other plants growing around the grass as it 
as well offered a refuge and resource to the backyard ecology. Poynter 
took this discovery into forming her own company, Paragon Space 
Development Corporation, with the verified conviction that indeed 
“small things matter” in ecosystems. 
 Primary to continuing further in this paper, it is absolutely 
vital and necessary to understand that an ecosystem is entirely 
similar to the Greek symbol of Ouroboros, a self-eating serpent. 
Inputs of one organism serve as the outputs of another and, like the 
Nataraja of the Hindu God Shiva, are constituted through acts of 
creative destruction. Poynter’s discovery mirrors the effect of GMOs 
and any ecosystem into which they are introduced as the transgenic 
genetic materials or resistances (though will be evolutionarily 
counteracted) change the ecosystem on a micro level with macro 
consequences. 
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Chapter Four: Returning to the Human Concern of Agency 
Introducing toxic proteins, even if harmless to humans, presents 
a serious ecological concern. The problem, if it is not already clear 
enough, is that ecosystems are complex holistic manifolds in which 
consequences are neither immediately apparent nor testable from the 
great fecundity of variables which cannot be clearly demarcated. The 
orientation of this subsection is towards elucidating and making real 
the sort of Michael Crichton cautionary tales as in The Andromeda 
Strain (1969), Jurassic Park (1990), and most poignantly the example 
in Prey (2002).  
The superfluous referencing of pop culture is not merely 
incidental, Crichton’s work aided in transforming the romantic 
critiques of the eighteenth century into a modern context. The 
Andromeda Strain inverts H.G. Wells’ conclusion in The War of the 
Worlds (1898) as Earth being beset by an alien pathogen, rather than 
the bacteria and viruses of Earth affecting an invader. Again as in 
Wells’ The War of the Worlds, we are provided with the lesson that 
life, even exotic and threatening life, cannot fully adapt to alien 
ecosystems. Again, a lesson here is also learned in that introducing 
genetically modified organisms into a natural environment will 
undoubtedly face challenges in adaptation which are not readily 
accessible to the novel’s characters. Wells’ martians and the alien 
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pathogen in The Andromeda Strain fail to thrive from relatively simple 
biological and chemical conventions – disease and pH, respectively. 
Never dawning onto this realization until this point, Jurassic 
Park is a re-adaptation of Wells’ The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896), 
wherein both works include an island that is transformed into a 
laboratory where Shelleyesque monsters are designed with the help of 
science, leaving readers with the general theme that nature, when 
perverted through reckless applications of science, leaves a disunity 
between humanity and our environment. As will later be explored, this 
can even debase human dignity. 
Prey’s plot mirrors the exact concerns Dennis M. Bushnell voiced 
in his PowerPoint presentation, “Future Strategic Issues/Future 
Warfare [Circa 2025],” to NASA colleagues. The novel presents the 
scenario of swarming and self-replicating nanomachines capable of 
adapting to their environment in ways that were not imagined by their 
developers. Spoilers aside, the self-replicating nanomachines emerge 
to become a serious “grey goo” concern, a real possibility imagined by 
Dr. K. Eric Drexler, in which self-replicating nanomachines “run amok” 
and break down biological material, “eventually turning everything 
into ‘grey goo’” (Motavalli 2009, p. 25). 
 Departures in fiction aside, scenarios of rDNA and transgenic 
plants becoming “wild” in nature are a very real concern. Not only can 
GMOs cause havoc on ecosystems or be rendered useless by an ecosystem; 
their deployment and use can also limit overall biodiversity and 
thereby become a liability in food security. 
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 “For 10,000 years, we have altered the genetic makeup of our 
crops,” Pamela Ronald opines in a 2013 issue of the Boston Review. 
“Given that modern genetic engineering is similar to techniques that 
have served humanity well for thousands of years and that the risks of 
unintended consequences are similar whether the variety is derived 
from the processes of GE or conventional gene alternation, it should 
come as no surprise that the GE crops currently on the market are as 
safe to eat and safe for the environment as organic or conventional 
foods,” she continues (Ronald 2013, p. 17). 
The Cavendish banana subgroup (a cultivar of Musa acuminate) and 
Ireland’s “Great Famine” help to illustrate how such a disaster would 
come about from a lack of biodiversity, and demonstrates where 
Ronald’s views are shortsighted. Where the Cavendish banana currently 
suffers from a lack of biodiversity, Ireland’s “Great Famine” acts a 
historical example in which one species of potato was nearly 
eradicated from disease. Potatoes and bananas are prime examples of 
evolution’s capacity to winnow populations of like similarity. Similar 
indeed, both the common potato and banana are clonal crops, meaning 
they reproduce the cultivar and tuber through replication of the plant 
itself (Rosen 1999, p. 295). Yet one final similarity is where the 
problem enters into focus. Both the Cavendish and the potato suffer 
from fungal blights: the potato faces the threat of Phytophthora 
infestans and the banana Xanthomonas euvesicatoria (Iskra-Caruana, 
Duroy, Chabannes, and Muller 2014, p. 84). Without genetic variation, 
resistances to P. infestans and X. euvesicatoria are null, leaving the 
only solution to be isolation and quarantine. Without constant 
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maintenance and monitoring of genetically modified crops, variation 
and diversity will become an issue. 
Mainsail to this problematizing of the danger is the issue of a 
winnowing in biological diversity. Studies on the issue offer scant 
insights as to what the risks amount to. G.V. Dana, A.R. Kapuscinski, 
and J.S. Donaldson attempted to ascertain such risk in conducting an 
“Ecological Risk Analysis,” or ERA, on the effects of GM maize on 
South African biodiversity. These were their findings: 
“We conducted two participatory ERA workshops in South Africa, 
analyzing potential impacts of GM maize on biodiversity. The 
first workshop involved only four biological scientists, who were 
joined by 18 diverse scientists and practitioners in the second, 
and we compared the ERA process and results between the two using 
descriptive statistics and semi-structure interview responses. 
The addition of diverse experts and practitioners led to a more 
comprehensive understanding of biological composition of the 
agro-ecosystem and a more ecologically relevant set of hazards, 
but impeded hazard prioritization at the generation of precise 
risk assessment values. Results suggest that diverse 
participation can improve the scoping or problem formulation of 
the ERA by generating an ecologically robust set of information 
on which to base the subsequent, more technical risk assessment” 
(G.V. Dana, A.R. Kapuscinski, and J.S. Donaldson 2012, p. 134). 
As proper scientists, they noted that their findings were inconclusive 
on the original research topic. However, they also suggest having laid 
the groundwork through a more “comprehensive understanding of 
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biological composition of the agro-ecosystem” for future ERA studies 
(G.V. Dana, A.R. Kapuscinski, and J.S. Donaldson 2012, p. 134). Only 
at this point is it prudent to suggest that a decrease in speciation 
and variation of an “agro-ecosystem” could portend disaster in the 
form of a pathogen, pest, or maladaptation spurned on by a nearly 
unlimited number of ecological factors. It is simply best to heed the 
warnings of clonal crops and note that their vulnerabilities owed to 
genetic similarities could very well bring about their extinction. 
 
Life as an Intellectual Property: 
Research and development in producing GM seedstock is a costly, 
multimillion-dollar venture. Like any other business with high 
overhead, mechanisms must be enacted to protect the investments so as 
to not only allow a return but also secure those returns for future 
financial quarters. It is precisely at this juncture in the analysis 
where the question of human rights begins to emerge from the gaseous 
opaque ether of instrumental reason and its application in the 
biological sciences. 
Covering this section is a high order. It encompasses the 
constitutive cross-section of where science merges with economics and 
politics. Thoroughly investigated, it could easily form the subject 
matter of a volume series with theses of its own right. With the 
intent of brevity and to set up the basic problems, I intend to fixate 
on select themes so as to quickly draw in the following section the 
topic of human rights specifically. This section will focus on 
intellectual property, genetic rights management, genetic use 
49 
 
restriction technology, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and 
Biosecurity of 2000, and its institutional and internal failings. 
Strangely, though not in a flippant or arbitrary manner, I feel 
that Crichton’s Jurassic Park helps towards introducing these topics. 
In the novel, chief geneticist Dr. Henry Wu explains that the 
engineered animals have been deprived of the ability to produce 
lysine, an essential amino acid. Lysine is critically vital in forming 
Acetyl-CoA carboxylase, a molecule necessary in the catalytic “first 
step” in the biosynthesis of “fatty acid” that acts as a “metabolic 
pathway required for several important biological processes including 
the synthesis and maintenance of cellular membranes” (Polyak, Abell, 
Wilce, Zhang, and Booker 2012, p. 983). Without including supplements 
of lysine in the diet of the engineered animals, the animals would 
eventually die. The purpose for this “lysine contingency” is in 
preventing the escape of any species and to also prevent rival biotech 
firms from using pilfered DNA to easily recreate their own animals. 
Encoding a similar contingency into every GMO has its advantages 
and disadvantages. GM crops outside of fiction are similarly patented 
and, likewise, engineered with GeRM (Genetic Rights Management) or 
GURT (Genetic Use Restriction Technology) for the same reasons as in 
Crichton’s novel. An article appearing in a 2008 edition of the 
Journal of Business Ethics explains it rather nicely: 
“There are two main categories of GURTs: T-GURTs, which restrict 
the expression of a certain trait (phenotype) by switching on or 
off a specific group of genes responsible for particular 
phenotypic expressions; and V-GURTs, which restrict the use of 
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the entire plant variety by switching on a gene that terminates 
further reproduction of the plant” (Bustos 2008, p. 65). 
The purpose of using GURT is twofold. First, as in the lysine 
contingency, it prevents the uncontrolled spread of a GMO, and second, 
it ensures planned obsolescence in the seedstock of farmers. This will 
be later addressed in the subsequent subtopic of human rights as 
GURT’s implications are wide reaching. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) was a landmark case 
decided before the United States Supreme Court which ruled that 
“living things are patentable if they represent novel, genetically 
altered variants of naturally occurring organisms” (Coyne 2013, p. 
42). Here, the overarching idea is that the Norns of technology, law, 
and economics have spun the fate of life itself into a patentable 
object, an intellectual property in its own right with profit 
incentive and mechanisms to control and dominate how that life 
replicates to ensure continued returns. Jan Art Scholte observed that, 
in regard to its span, “[g]lobal governance has figured importantly in 
both new sectors [bio and nanotechnology], inter alia by enshrining 
the intellectual property rights that provide much of the legal 
framework for profit making from these technologies” (Scholte 2000, p. 
175). 
 Indeed, now the concern of human rights is beginning to take 
form. The idiomatic can of worms is with full certainty open and its 
invertebrate contents are assuredly squirming. Everything considered 
until this point, specifically regarding the role of technology and 
instrumental reason, has merged with respect to what can be considered 
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as property within the purview of law and rights. Marcuse complicates 
the triad of liberty, technology, and oppression in remarking that 
under the “rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a 
powerful instrument of domination” (Marcuse 1964, p. 17). Further, the 
range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in 
determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and 
what is chosen by the individual” (Marcuse 1964, p. 17). Instead, the 
true “criterion for free choice can never be an absolute one, but 
neither is it entirely relative” (Marcuse 1964, p. 17). He quips that 
with regard to a democratic political order, the “free election of 
masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves” (Marcuse 1964, p. 
17). Most importantly, “[f]ree choice among a wide variety of goods 
and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services 
sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear – that is, if 
they sustain alienation” (Marcuse 1964, p. 17). 
 In special attention paid to the above selections, the shear 
gravity of problems originating from genetic engineering within an 
open society is now plainly obvious. The “choosing” between organic or 
GM, if a task were even easy, let alone possible, does not unfurl the 
knots of repression. What is more is that temporarily increasing crop 
yields constitutes more than a simple “superimposed need” like the 
automobile, a common and legitimate target of the Frankfurt School, 
food prices maintaining a price floor and general availability is 
necessary in preventing famine. Consider for a moment the progression 
of science and what has been established as possibilities in genetic 
engineering until this point, and reflect on the potential human costs 
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of all effects associated with those causes. Postulated effects, 
insofar as the aspect of “rights” is concerned, range from the mundane 
of being mandated to grow a certain strain of proprietary grass on 
one’s property, to the absurd and frightening thought that one must 
choose whether to engineer the genetics of their children given the 
practice being a widespread norm. Beyond whatever reaction these 
realities evoke within the reader, the most troubling of all ought to 
be the fact that the technology to govern life itself, with regard to 
its design, is privately owned. 
 Transitioning from plants to humans, GM technology and the issue 
of patents was the prime and critical reason why the Human Genome 
Project sought to catalog the human genome and release it into the 
public domain. If it had been accomplished sooner and by a private 
biotech firm, the findings would have been intertwined within patents 
(Parker and Parker 2003). Even still, modulating a particular gene for 
one cause or another can be patented. 23andMe, a corporation that 
provides genetic ancestry through mitochondrial DNA and y-chromosomal 
DNA testing to consumers, has been issued a patent (US 8187811) 
“related to human polymorphisms associated with Parkinson’s disease” 
(Harrison 2012, p. 510). A problem is in that the company, offering 
its genetic ancestry services, has “blurred the line between consumers 
and research subjects” (Harrison 2012, p. 510). 
 What does this imply for the status of human dignity when the 
species has come upon a point in history where the modification of 
itself and other life is realized? George Kateb recognized that it was 
human dignity in the main that could potentially ignite a “monstrous 
53 
 
pride” that “drives people to exploit nature for human purposes and 
hence to ravage nature and ultimately make the earth uninhabitable” 
(Kateb 2011, p. 4). Dignity would seem to correlate with hubris, 
however Kateb’s argument is that it is dignity itself that must be 
preserved in order to inoculate against abuses in power and in that 
very hubris. He wrote that it was dignity that compels us to “direct 
[our] energies, as no other species can [emphasis added], to the 
stewardship of nature and therefore curtail its mad presumption 
against nature” (Kateb 2011, p. 5). His argument is a rather effective 
one in the problem of genetic engineering, and that is if our species 
is so unique that we have even reached the possibility of being able 
to permanently alter nature, we have an obligation to maintain the 
order of nature and not pervert it, or we risk destroying our own 
dignity in the process. 
Inverting the analysis from humans back onto plants, that is 
exactly what GM foods have so far achieved – the blurring of lines 
between consumers and research subjects. The research subject however, 
in this case, is the Earth’s biosphere. Everyone within that biosphere 
should, in the best possible world, be aware of what is being done on 
their own behalf and also what they are consuming. One need not even 
need to consume a GMO to be potentially vulnerable: once one becomes 
wild or hybridized exposure is environmental. Just as the history of 
human experimentation has been turbulent in securing consent and 
knowledge of the experiments being conducted - the Tuskegee syphilis 
experiment and the U.S. Army’s “Operation WHITECOAT” - those 
potentially harmed by GMOs must also be informed. Just as the 
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Declarations of Helsinki (1964) and Geneva (1948) set standards in 
human experimentation, similar standards must be employed towards 
humans living within any ecosystem affected by variants of genetically 
engineered species as a logical conclusion. With the consequences of 
transgenic applications unknown outside of their “breaking free” and 
causing ecologies to adapt and mutate in response, they are 
essentially experiments in progress.  
Such reasoning was the basis for the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety and Biosecurity in 2000 and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (1993). Where the Convention on Biological Diversity sought 
to preserve biodiversity as a principle, the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety and Biosecurity attempts to prevent ecological crises from 
human intervention. However, it must be stated that neither is wholly 
perfect nor indeed effective at grappling with the issue of novel 
applications of GM technology. Problems that have arisen from these 
conventions and agreements include a low number of signatories, the 
reliance on a precautionary principle, the difficulties in oversight, 
and avoidance of contradictions in honoring other international 
agreements, such as those within the World Trade Organization. 
In an article that appears in the Pace Environmental Law Review 
titled “International Development of Microbial Pest Control Agents: 
Falling Between the Cracks of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol?” Guy Knudsen identifies inherent 
problems with the protocols. A section titled “Biological Control of 
Plant Pests: A ‘Biodiversity-Friendly’ Technology?” features Knudsen 
noting the problems with the Green Revolution’s overuse of pesticides 
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and the importance of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) in the 
development of GM crops and that the use of microbes to control pests 
have for the most part been regarded as benign without much scrutiny 
beyond the Biological Weapons Convention of 1975 (Knudsen 2013, p. 
630). This acts as a problem in that, again, no one is quite certain 
what the long term effects of approaches to pest control such as B. 
thuringiensis may ultimately be. 
Similarly, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and Biosecurity 
attempts to mitigate the “doomsday scenario” of GMOs on the basis of a 
precautionary principle. Just as Scholte remarked in the latter half 
of the previous subtopic, Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring write 
that the “tense and potentially conflicting relationship between the 
international trade order represented by the World Trade Organization 
and various multilateral environmental agreements, such as the 
Cartagena Protocol, constitute a prominent element of the broader 
agenda of institutional interaction” (Oberthür and Gehring 2006, p. 
12). On this relationship, they uncovered two findings: one, that the 
precautionary principle is effectively weak; and two, that the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety co-opted and began to align with the 
WTO on the trade of GMOs. 
 As food and life becomes intellectual property managed by biotech 
firms, food transitions away from more of a privilege rather than a 
right. And, echoing Marcuse, the choice “from” becomes increasingly 
untenable. Corporate policies and controversies surrounding Monsanto 
aid to illuminate the nuances of this rather well. While initially 
supporting “smallholders” in their “Monsanto Smallholder Programme” 
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(SHP), helping the resource-poor, rural, and small farmers with GM 
strains of crops as part of a corporate social responsibility 
platform, the company came to switch face and ask for royalties while 
enforcing ownership of their intellectual property (Glover 2007, p. 
851). As addressed earlier in the section on GURT, “farmers are [also] 
restricted from saving genetically engineered (GE) seeds” (Martin 
2013, p. 95). Continuing further, Martin, writing for the DePaul 
Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law emphatically 
described the companies practices in “[using] its combination of seed 
utility patents, licensing arrangements, and patent infringement 
litigation against farmers to restrain competition in the seed 
industry” (Martin 2013, p. 96). In sum, and as developed in the 
preceding subtopics, Monsanto is the example par excellence of 
diminishing biodiversity through eliminating competition and through 
engineering uniformity of phenotypes among crops, employing GURT for 
financial incentives rather than for biological containment of 
recombinant DNA, and lastly, transforming life itself into an 
intellectual property. 
 Every human existing currently now or in the future is entitled 
by right to know how their food is produced, so that they can from 
that understanding, ascertain if those means are ethical. Also, 
humanity deserves, as a right, access to any plant or animal’s genetic 
code, modified or otherwise. Organic molecules composed of adenine, 
guanine, cytosine, and thymine are constituted by these fundamental 
nucleotides, building DNA and RNA – the essence of life itself, but 
not life merely. Unquestionably, GMOs do alter our ecosystems, if even 
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indirectly. Public discourse, disclosure, and legislative attempts to 
label GMOs should not be presented with obstacles and instead, 
examination and transparency. These principles are in accordance with 
a right of security, or self-preservation, a right to know, and a 
right of conscience to pose ethical questions. Questions that include 
a right to privacy for farmers and their crops stand as a relevant 
starting point in this measure. 
 Galvanized by an interest in the Free Software Foundation and the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation and their goal to advocate for 
consumer’s rights and non-propriety software, I viewed the issue of 
GMOs as a direct corollary. Though we may one day be able to modify 
nearly all plant and animal genomes in a fashion similar to the 
GNU/Linux operating system, the metaphor of the present is that we are 
in a “walled garden” approach similar to Apple products. Formats, 
devices, and environments are all strictly designed to cohabitate and 
not cooperate with alternatives. DRM or Digital Rights Management 
functions in a similar capacity as GURT; users’ limitations are 
developed to exercise more control over how software is used rather 
than for their safety or benefit. Effectively, we currently have the 
equivalent of software patents on our food when it comes to their 
genetic makeup, and these patents are enforced through law as well as 
technology in the form of genetic use restriction technology. This is 
not to our benefit as famine is more often a problem of distribution 
rather than production, and proprietary ownership of agriculture 
further stifles distribution. Either permit open gene “hacking,” or 
limit the technology altogether. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion - On Going Forward 
 Every action, every activity, is surrounded by defects as a fire 
 is surrounded by smoke.  
Krishna, Bhagavad Gita: Chapter 18, Verse 48 
 
Cartesian metaphysics performed a true miracle in its vivisection 
and separation of the mind from the body. A revolution of its own 
right, Descartes and his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) helped 
spur on the dialog that would eventually unfold into the greater 
European Enlightenment, laying the groundwork for scientific inquiry 
and advanced methods for instrumental reason to truly thrive. 
Communities such as the Vienna Circle, inspired by the work of German 
physicist Ernst Mach would later refine instrumental reason to its 
fullest extent, acting as a showcase to power and progress as seen in 
the radical technological developments of the twentieth century. But 
therein was a most serious problem. Advocates and apologists of 
instrumental reason never questioned why they pursued their aims until 
the theoretical possibilities of nuclear and environmental collapses 
became evident. Even after such a point, instrumental reason, argue 
its proponents, is the only game in town. Descartes did more than just 
identify the source of cognition; he fractured the plate hosting 
humanity and nature, and began the divide of the continental shelf. 
This is not a condemnation of his work nor any who owe much of their 
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influence to him. I would say that this tangent’s purpose is to 
identify when a science broke from a holism and made the world more 
measurable in isolating variables to manipulate with reason. 
Contemporary science concedes that ecosystems are complex 
organisms. I am not entirely certain whether the analogy can fully 
capture how truly complex they are. Organisms have externalities and 
boundaries, and they are defined in a temporal schema. Ecosystems 
however are not confined to the same boundaries as an organism which 
inhabits it. Here I believe the Lovelock Hypothesis or “Gaia theory” 
explains what an ecosystem resembles in that there are feedback 
mechanisms, geophysical cycles, and even astronomical inputs and 
outputs that all can contribute to effects, becoming causes in 
themselves (Buratovich 2013). 
Potential solutions to avert global ecological or human 
catastrophes can exist within a new science that embraces figures like 
Lovelock, or by those who wield approaches to scientific progress in a 
way distinct from what Einstein viewed as an “axe in the hands of a 
pathological criminal” (Neffe 2007, p. 256). Integrative and 
decentralized solutions that mirror biology’s innate mechanisms of 
survival are a keen starting point to remedy any oppressive use of any 
technology, not just GMOs. One such means includes the perfecting of 
the photo-bio reactor, a tube circulating nutrient rich water along a 
growth medium culturing edible algae. 
I also spoke to a PhD candidate, Mariano Alvarez, in the 
University of South Florida’s plant biology laboratory studying 
epigenetics in wetlands vegetation. He shared many of my concerns 
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regarding GMO technologies. Though I learned that there will soon 
exist no single monopoly on the technology as gene sequencing becomes 
more accessible to the general population, the solution of preserving 
biodiversity is in reducing the use of isogenic crops. Instead, 
farmers are better served by sectioning their fields with differing 
genetic lines of a crop so that in the event of an ecological or 
environmental hardship, recessive alleles in one lineage may offer a 
reprieve to the others. Fundamentally, what I learned was that biology 
and those working within biology mirror the anarchic basis of post-
left political thought. Lifeforms are decentralized, self-propagating 
and actualizing entities that function towards reshaping and sometimes 
smashing oppressive systems to overcome and adapt. Seeing GM 
technology as an end or a solution is a folly, as life or ecosystems 
react constantly. GMO technology and industrial agriculture practices 
have yet to comprehend the same issue present in the medical field of 
“super bugs” emergent from widespread use of antibiotics. Systems and 
life are insoluble with one another; life circumvents systems in 
building its telos-free structure. 
However, like GM technology, “hydraulic fracturing” is now being 
proposed as a solution to the problems of the day, such as the costs 
of production and that we are faced with a definite resource scarcity. 
Like the notion of efficiency behind GM technology, hydraulic 
fracturing (or “fracking”) unfortunately has costs of its own. For 
example, people become sick through the chemicals that are released 
(Ehrenberg 2012, p. 23), and fracking has been implicated to cause 
earthquakes (Wilson 2013, p. 20). These great costs of health and 
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safety are endured so that humanity can continue toward further 
applying instrumental reason, rather than asking questions on the 
basic order of “why are GMOs necessary?” In this Sisyphean endeavor we 
seem to diminish our dignity while disregarding basic rights 
recognized by the United Nations, such as clean drinking water 
(harmful chemicals used in fracking are introduced into the water 
table) (Adlard 2015). We also continue the usually not-so-appalling 
practice of privatization to lifeforms as a final stake in the rail. 
To demonstrate this point Q.E.D. in what I feel to be its barest 
sense, I will utilize as one last example, the product known as an 
“EcoSphere.” Manufactured by EcoSphere Associated, Inc., EcoSpheres 
are glass spheres of filtered seawater that function as “self-
sustaining ecosystems” (eco-sphere.com 2015). You never “have to feed 
the life within,” reads its description (eco-sphere.com 2015). Meant 
to adorn desks or windowsills, these spheres embody what an attempt of 
instrumental reason looks like in ordering synthetic ecosystems. The 
caveat is that while the “organisms [living] within the EcoSphere 
utilize their resources without overpopulating or contaminating their 
environment,” they only have “an average life expectancy of two years” 
(eco-sphere.com 2015). Again, what we are to take from this is that 
ecosystems escape traditional applications in instrumental reason. 
Proponents of raw instrumental reason must realize that they cannot 
separate themselves from nature while trying to devise solutions for 
nature. Also, in thanks to George Kateb’s Human Dignity (2011) we also 
learn that which protects our rights — dignity — is diminished when 
our hubris runs amok. 
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 As far as possible solutions (though unconventional), there is a 
humorous segment in a 2008 documentary directed by Astra Taylor titled 
Examined Life. In the documentary, Taylor encourages philosophers and 
social theorists such as Judith Butler, Cornel West, Peter Singer, and 
Michael Hardt on the streets of New York City to speak about their 
approaches to theory and praxis in the modern world. When Taylor asks 
Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek what he believes should be done 
about the problem of pollution while filming in a large-scale garbage 
processing facility, Žižek identifies that the ecological narrative of 
humanity and technology disrupting what was once organic is wrong. He 
posits that this is a “secular version of the religious story of the 
fall” (Taylor 2008). Instead, “nature” should be considered as a “big 
series of unimaginable catastrophes” (Taylor 2008). He notes that we 
all are aware of what ecological problems exist, but the remaining 
question is why we have not yet devised a solution. The argument made 
is that garbage must not be hidden and that it should be something 
that we live amongst so that we can “confront properly the threat of 
ecological catastrophe” exactly through “cutting off [our] roots [to] 
nature” (Taylor 2008). “We require more alienation” and “we should 
become more artificial . . . true ecologists love this” (Taylor 2008). 
Perhaps in either case, McKenna’s reintegration with nature or Žižek’s 
disavowing of the natural, we will come to realize how our problems 
became so problematic through synthesis while being able to see where 
the past watermarks of ecology and human rights once stagnated. 
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